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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

NIC 00697-84

National Intelligence Council

30 January 1984

NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI
DDI
VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer)

FROM: John Horton
NIO/LA

SUBJECT: Note on Castro

Here are some points about relations
with Cuba that you wanted a note on. Also

[redacted] that talks about recent
examples of the Cuban signals.

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John Horton
John Horton

Attachment:
as stated

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DCI
EXEC
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C-385

30 January 1984

SUBJECT: The Success of Cuba's Signals

- Castro and the Cubans for a number of years have played the game of telling the gullible they want better relations with the United States and that our government refuses to listen.
- Currently, the French government, President Betancur, the Panamanians are passing this on to us. Many of those who are so used by the Cubans are well-meaning and are drawn to play the game because of their innocence, the innocence being combined with a desire to have a starring role in international statecraft.
- We can expect a number of our own citizens to find appealing the suggestion that our government either does not appreciate Castro's desires for good relations or that we are obdurate in rejecting them.
- It is tempting to consider trying to spike Castro's guns by going public with a clear, moderate, and accurate description of what the Cubans are up to and how they go about it. This might help to show our awareness of the tactic, it might impress those willing to listen, and it might bring a cool reality to the question of our relations.
- We might also go directly to the Cubans, saying that we are always ready to discuss better relations, reminding them that supporting revolution throughout Latin America and their close ties to the Soviet Union are subjects we would want to discuss early on.
- Neither approach will change Castro's ways, but a limited end might be gained by the use of one or both.

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